Horizontal mergers are usually under the scrutiny of antitrust authorities due to their potential undesirable e¤ects on prices and consumer surplus. Ex-post evidence, however, suggests that not always these e¤ects take place and even relevant mergers may end up having negligible price e¤ects. The analysis of mergers in the context of nonlocalized spatial competition may o¤er a further interpretation to the ones proposed in the literature: in this framework both positive and zero price e¤ects are possible outcomes of the merger activity.
Introduction
Antitrust authorities worldwide are highly concerned with the price e¤ects of mergers (Whinston, 2007) . When two or more …rms operating in the same market merge, the concentration of the market increases and this may drive to undesirable increases in prices with a consequent damage for consumers.
According to Weinberg (2008) , "the agencies review mergers in an e¤ort to identify and block mergers if they would increase prices". For these reasons several approaches have been developed in the literature and by the practitioners to evaluate the price e¤ects: "event studies" based on the behaviour of the stock markets evaluation of the companies involved, "simulation studies" based on theoretical models of mergers and appropriately parametrized and "direct studies" of the price e¤ects within a speci…c industry (Pautler, 2001 ; Weinberg, 2008) . Although the literature mainly focuses on price increasing mergers, as they a¤ect consumers and society's welfare, a number of papers also provide ex-post evidence of little or no price e¤ect of merging activity: a common trait of the retrospective evidence available is that not always anti-competitive e¤ects arise (Ashenfelter et al., 2009 ). Ashenfelter and Hosken (2010) …nd that in two of the …ve mergers that they consider, no substantial price e¤ect was registered. In particular, the Aurora-Kraft syrup merger had almost no e¤ect while the Marathon-Ashland joint venture in the gasoline sector had negative (although non-signi…cant) medium term e¤ects on prices; the latter case is also discussed by Taylor Whirlpool's acquisition of Maytage, a merger of two large manufacturers of appliances. They …nd no change in the prices of washing machines and sensible price increase only for some categories of products. Simpson and Taylor (2008) analyse the e¤ects of MAP's 1999 acquisition of Ultraman Diamond Shamrock's terminaling assets on retail prices in Michigan: they analyse gasoline prices in six cities for a period of …ve years and …nd no evidence that the transaction led to higher prices. In the same sector, Csorba et al. (2011) obtain economically negligible price e¤ects studying two almost simultaneous mergers in the Hungarian retail gasoline market. In Spain, the acquisition by DISA of Shell's activities leads to no signi…cant e¤ect on pricing (Jiménez and Perdiguero, 2012) . Neumann and Sanderson (2007) analyse the Corus and WIC merger by collecting information from market participants through interviews, other studies and from public sources about post-merger conditions. Although their evidence might have a limited value, they conclude that price increases are mostly attributed to in ‡ation.
Several explanations for no-price e¤ect of mergers have been proposed: the e¢ ciency gains argument is the most common and it is used by most …rms in defending a merger's proposal; another factor may be collusion in the market before a merger takes place (Jiménez and Perdiguero, 2012) ; or the competitive e¤ect of actual (Ashenfelter and Hosken, 2010; Taylor and Hosken, 2007) or potential substitutes (Ashenfelter et. al., 2009 ). However, the retrospective evidence is mixed and does not always support the proposed explanations. Connor et al. (1998) , for example, analyse general hospitals' mergers: they …nd a 5% price decrease in merging hospitals relative to non-merging ones. In addition, they …nd that costs also decrease by about 5% in the merging hospitals, indicating an almost perfect passthrough of the cost-savings on prices. Csorba et al. (2011) believe that no price e¤ect derives from managerial decisions to stick with the pre-merger pricing policies, while Neumann and Sanderson (2007) and Simpson and Taylor (2008) provide no interpretation at all. This paper proposes a simple theoretical analysis of mergers in di¤erentiated product industries which may provide a further explanation for the ex-post evidence on the price effects of a merger. In our framework, in fact, some horizontal mergers induce substantial price e¤ects while others do not have any e¤ect at all.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 locates our contribution in the literature. Section 3 brie ‡y reviews the spokes model and its properties. Mergers are introduced in section 4. Section 5 discusses the price e¤ects of mergers, comparing the pre-merger with the post-merger equilibria. Concluding remarks follow in section 6.
Related literature and contribution
We study the e¤ects of horizontal mergers in the context of "non-localized" competition. The "traditional" approach to spatial competition uses the circular city model of Vickrey (1964) , also referred to as the Salop (1979) model: one of its limits is to only allow to address "localized" spatial competition (Rothschild, 2000) . Chen and Riordan (2007a) develop a new tool to analyse spatial di¤erentiation which naturally …ts to the idea of "nonlocalized" competition, the spokes model. In this model …rms are located at the extreme of a market constituted of several spokes all linked at a common centre. There may be more spokes than …rms (Chen and Riordan, 2007a) or as many spokes as …rms (Caminal and Claici, 2007) . The model has two main properties. First, it allows to study multi-…rm spatial competition with no neighbouring e¤ects; second, when the number of …rms tends to in…nity, it captures the idea of monopolistic competition à la Chamberlin.
The model is particularly useful to analyse markets in which consumers have a strong preference for a speci…c brand while being rather indi¤erent among alternatives: natural examples are markets for composite goods that require original parts to be completed or repaired. In a merger context, the spokes approach has a desirable feature: competition is non-localized and, in equilibrium, all …rms are competing against each other. The e¤ect of a merger is then to reduce the intensity of competition. The price e¤ect, however, depends on which segment of the market …rms are targeting when setting prices. The demand for the …rms'product is composed of several segments characterized by di¤erent elasticities. There exist, then, equilibria in which mergers have important price e¤ects: these mergers also imply demand effects that lead to increased transportation costs and, consequently, negative welfare e¤ects. However, if …rms target a "kink" of the demand function, equilibria with no price e¤ect arise as in Economides (1989 Economides ( , 1993 . These results can be interpreted as a further possible explanation of the mixed evidence on the price e¤ects of mergers in the empirical literature.
The contribution of this paper is also related to the literature on en-dogenous mergers. The goal of many papers on this topic is to solve the paradoxes posed by the game theoretical analysis of mergers and coalition formation. One of the puzzles is that under price competition and di¤eren-tiated products, mergers are always pro…table for insiders (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985) . However, the equilibrium displays free-riding properties:
"outsiders" earn higher pro…ts than "insiders". This property also characterizes our analysis: in the regions where prices increase following a merger, outsiders'prices and pro…ts raise more than the ones of insiders'. In other instances, however, prices do not increase. Brito (2003) considers mergers in the context of the circular city. He shows that even if market power is the motivation for a merger, …rms may want to be insiders (preemptive merger) and the impact of the merger on the rival …rms depends on their locations.
Firms may prefer to be insiders even if some outsiders bene…t more (but others less). In this context, he …nds that mergers have relevant impacts on prices only if one of the neighbouring …rms takes part into it. On the contrary, our zero-price e¤ect result is not related to the proximity of …rms, which plays no relevant role in the spokes model. Braid (1999) considers two-dimensional competition between …rms located on a grid: the price effects of a merger are lower due to a reduction in the bene…ts of merging for insiders. As opposed to standard single dimension models, this feature implies that the incentives to raise prices are spread in di¤erent directions.
Our results contribute to the rapidly ‡ourishing literature on the spokes model as a tool for analysis of multi-…rm di¤erentiated product competition. 1 In this context Caminal and Granero (2012) , who analyse the role of multi-product …rms in supplying variety, is the closest paper to ours. They consider a continuous approximation of the model in which a multi-product …rm competes against a fringe. In our paper, a merger also results in consti- 1 The spokes model is used, between others, by Caminal and Claici (2007) 
The constraints are imposed to ensure that the consumer is located on either of the spokes and not outside.
2.
Customers on the i-th …rm's spoke who do not have an existing alternative brand and customers who do not have a …rst favorite brand but have i as a second favorite. The marginal consumer in the set of these two types is identi…ed by:
Simplifying the constraints, the demand function is de…ned by the following segments:
where 2=N is the mass of consumers on each spoke, 1=(N 1) is the probability of …rm being a customers'second favorite brand and
is the probability of a consumer having no …rst or no second favorite brand available. The following regularity conditions need to be satis…ed: jp p i j < 1; 8 6 = i; and v p i 1=2 to ensure that competition between …rms occurs.
The …rst order conditions identifying the equilibrium prices are given by:
2 Despite being aware of the existence of di¤erent types of customers, …rms use a unique price and do not price discriminate. 
Given the de…nition of the demand and pro…t functions, it can be checked that there exist four possible equilibrium regions. 3 The equilibrium regions are characterized depending on v, the parameter capturing consumers'evaluation of the good; the equilibrium prices before a merger takes place, p bm , are de…ned as in Table 1 : Table 1 . Before Merger Equilibrium Prices.
The details of the derivations can be found in Proposition 1 of Chen and Riordan 
Horizontal Mergers
Following the literature, it is assumed that the merging …rms maximize their joint pro…ts. The after merger pro…ts are split in equal parts between the participating …rms and we abstract from bargaining considerations: in other words, the only e¤ect of a merger is to create a multi-product …rm.
The E¤ects of a Merger
Suppose that a merger of k of the n …rms, k < n, takes place creating M .
Denote by i 2 I = f1; :::; kg a …rm belonging to M . All other …rms are symmetric and indexed by i 2 O = fk + 1; :::; ng. Let us denote by S the set of all …rms (S = I [ O). In a market featuring N spokes, the number of active …rms reduces to m = n k + 1.
Focus …rst on the merged …rms who constituted M . The following equation:
still identi…es the indi¤erent customers who have an alternative brand existing on the market and the set of indi¤erent consumers is described by:
Notice, however, that now there are two subsets of indi¤erent consumers:
consumers whose other brand is supplied by one of the other …rms taking part to the merger (j 2 M; j 6 = i) and consumers whose other brand is supplied by one of the outsiders (j 2 O). Indi¤erent customers with no kind of alternative brand are still identi…ed by:
To sum up, from the perspective of one of the …rms who took part to the merger and constituted …rm M there are three types of customers after the merger; hence, a randomly drawn customer is of a certain type with the following probabilities:
1.
N 1 : probability of a customer that has its second favourite brand supplied by …rms located on other spokes but belonging to M ; 2.
n k N 1 : probability of a customer that has an alternative brand not supplied by other factories a¢ liated to M ;
3.
N n N 1 : probability of a customer that does not have a second favourite brand.
The merger does not necessarily imply a market expansion e¤ect: the agents that do not have a …rst or a second favourite brand available are still excluded: the fraction of this type of consumers is una¤ected by the merging activity.
The demand function of the merger M is de…ned by the sum of the segments served by the k …rms. Proceeding in a similar way as in the benchmark case, the demand for each of the k segments is given by:
The …rst term between square brackets represents consumers with both favourite brands being supplied by M . The second term represents consumers whose second favourite brand is supplied by one of the outsider …rms. The third term identi…es the demand of the consumers whose only desired brand is supplied by …rm i. The demand of each of these segments is weighted by the respective probabilities of a given consumer being one of the three possible types described above.
Turning to outsider …rms, their demand is:
For each case, the three terms represent, respectively, the demand faced from consumers who have, as other favourite, a brand supplied by …rms in M , consumers who have, as other favourite, a brand supplied by another non-merged …rm and consumers whose only desired brand is supplied by the …rm. The pro…t functions for the merged entity and for each outsider are respectively:
The …rst order conditions for the merged and the non-merged …rms are, respectively:
Comparing (4) and (5), the e¤ect of the merger is to lead each of the participating …rms to internalize the externalities imposed by one's own price choices on the demand for other brands in the merger. This property, …rst illustrated by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) , plays an important role in determining the results and it is further discussed in Section 5. As in the benchmark, regularity conditions, i.e. jp p i j < 1; 8 2 I; 8i 2 I; 6 = i, have to be imposed.
The After-Merger Equilibrium
The after merger equilibrium regions and corresponding prices for the merged and non-merged …rms, denoted by p m and p nm , are characterized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
In presence of an horizontal merger of k …rms, constituting M , four equilibrium regions can be identi…ed; they are characterized by the following prices and hold for the following ranges of values of v:
Proof see Appendix A. 
Results and Discussion

The main result
Bringing together the results of the pre-merger benchmark situation in Section 3 and the post-merger equilibrium in Section 4, we identify four equilibrium regions.
De…nition 1 Four equilibrium regions can be identi…ed:
and they are characterized by the following before and after merger prices for both insiders and outsiders:
The four regions identi…ed in De…nition 1 can be seen as the analogous of the ones analysed by Chen and Riordan (2007a) in the context of a merger: the values of parameters corresponding to each region are given by the appropriate boundary between the ones de…ning the before and after merger equilibria. 4 As we shall see in Section 5.2, equilibria in these regions also share many properties of the ones in Chen and Riordan (2007a), presented in Section 3. Having identi…ed the equilibrium regions, we now provide conditions on the parameters that guarantee that these regions exist. 
which requires:
and k < n < 2k + 1 4 + p 12k 2 20k + 9 4
(2) Region 2 exists provided that v 2D v 2U which requires: N n + shall assume that these conditions are satis…ed.
Our analysis focuses on the price e¤ects of a merger and now equilibrium prices before and after the merger can be compared. Proof See Appendix C.
The results in Proposition 2 are graphically illustrated in Figure 3 using a speci…c parametrization. Before and after-merger prices are plotted in the four equilibrium regions. 5 As it can be seen, in Regions 1 and 3 the aftermerger market price dominates the before merger price; in Regions 2 and 4 the two prices coincide.
Discussion
Proposition 2 states that in two of the equilibrium regions prices increase as a consequence of the merger while this is not the case in the remaining two regions. We shall …rst describe the mechanisms that lead to this result before providing an interpretation.
In Region 1, "standard" oligopolistic competition takes place: as the best response functions are upward sloping, both insiders and outsiders raise 5 The after merger price is de…ned as the average of the prices of insider and outsider …rms, with the market shares as weights. their prices, creating an overall increase of prices and earning higher pro…ts compared with the benchmark situation. The mechanisms described by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) apply to mergers in most price competition models and the spokes model is no exception: an outsider, …rm j; faces competition both from the …rms constituting M and from all other outsiders.
Then, …rm j shares with a given insider, …rm i; n 2 competitors; but both …rms face also another competitor. For the outsider …rm j this competitor is a member of the merger M , i.e. a …rm charging a higher price. The insider …rm, on the other hand, faces competition of another outsider …rm, which is charging a lower price. Hence, the outsider j faces less …erce price competition and, consequently, its pro…ts are higher than the ones of …rms in M .
In Region 2 a "kinked equilibrium" takes place as …rms concentrate on (n k)(2n+k 2) : From (2), the equilibrium requires v p m > 1; hence:
As both the …rst order and second order conditions are satis…ed at the candidate equilibrium, the most pro…table possible deviation for …rm M is to increase the price so that it reaches the demand kink at p D = v 1; in that case, it is most pro…table for the …rm to change all k prices rather than only a subset of them. If all k prices change, the deviation is not pro…table
. The latter implies that the possible deviation is not pro…table for …rm M provided that:
It follows that the candidate prices are an equilibrium for M for the following
Outsider …rm j: from the system of the …rst order conditions (4) and (5), evaluated using the second expressions in (2) and (3), the candidate equilibrium price for a representative non-merged …rm j (j 2 O) is:
(n k)(2n+k 2) : From (2), the equilibrium requires v p nm > 1; hence:
As both the …rst order and second order conditions are satis…ed at the candidate equilibrium, the most pro…table possible deviation for …rm j is to increase the price so that it reaches the demand kink at
. From the latter, the possible deviation is not pro…table for …rm M provided that:
It follows that the candidate price is an equilibrium for outsider …rms for the following values of v: v nm 1D < v v nm 1U :
By comparing (6) and (8), v m 1D is larger than v nm 1D and, as such, constitutes the stricter of the two constraints to guarantee that no …rm has an incentive to deviate. A similar comparison on (7) and (9) is not conclusive. Hence, the candidate prices constitute an equilibrium for the following values of v:
Region 2am
Merged entity M : the candidate equilibrium price is p m = v 1: The merged …rm M may consider to change h of its k prices (1 h k). The two possible deviations are to higher prices: p i > v 1 or to a lower prices:
In that case they face a demand given by the second expression in (2) . All other …rms stick to their equilibrium prices. Such potential deviation is not pro…table provided that:
where dp i = 0 for all the remaining (k h) prices that are not changed.
As the deviation pro…t increases in h, the most pro…table possible deviation takes place as h = k. Hence, to ensure that the possible deviation is not guaranteeing more pro…ts than at the equilibrium requires:
Suppose now that M considers to change h prices to p i < v 1. In that case they face a demand given by the …rst expression in (2) . All other …rms stick to their equilibrium prices. Such potential deviation is not pro…table provided that:
As the deviation pro…t increases in h, the most pro…table possible deviation takes place as h = k. The possible deviation should not lead to higher pro…ts than at the candidate equilibrium; this requires the following condition:
It follows that the candidate prices are an equilibrium for M for the
Outsider …rm j: the candidate equilibrium price for a representative non-merged …rm j (j 2 O) is p nm = v 1; an analogous reasoning can be used to rule out possible deviations. Suppose that …rm j considers raising its price to p j > v 1. In that case the demand faced is given by the second expression in (3) . Such potential deviation is not pro…table provided that:
which is equivalent to require:
Suppose …rm j consider decreasing the price to p j < v 1. In that case the demand faced is given by the …rst expression of (3). Such potential deviation is not pro…table provided that:
which is equivalent to:
It follows that the candidate price is an equilibrium for outsider …rms for the following values of v: v nm
2D
v v nm 2U : By comparing (10) and (12), v m 2D is larger than v nm 2D ; a similar comparison on (11) and (13) leads to conclude that v m 2U is smaller than v nm 2U so that the candidate prices constitute an equilibrium for:
Region 3am
Merged entity M : the system of the …rst order conditions (4) and (5), evaluated using the …rst expressions in (2) and (3) provide the candidate equilibrium prices for the merged …rm M :
From (2), the equilibrium requires
and:
It can be veri…ed that the second order conditions are satis…ed at the candidate equilibrium prices. It follows that the candidate prices are an equilibrium for M for the following values of v: v m 3D < v < v m 3U :
Outsider …rm j: consider now a representative non-merged …rm j (j 2 O); from the system of the …rst order conditions (4) and (5), evaluated using the …rst expressions in (2) and (3), the candidate equilibrium price is:
By (2), the equilibrium requires
It can be veri…ed that the second order conditions are satis…ed at the candidate equilibrium price. It follows that p nm is the equilibrium price for …rm
Comparing the thresholds, v m 3D is larger than v nm 3D and v nm 3U is smaller than v m 3U . Hence, the candidate prices constitute an equilibrium for the following values of v:
Region 4am
Merged entity M : the candidate equilibrium prices are in this case p m = In this case, …rms face a demand as if they were local monopolist on their market segment. As all other …rms stick to the candidate equilibrium prices, such a potential deviation is not pro…table provided that:
;p m ; p nm 0; 8i 2 I where dp i = 0 for all the remaining (k h) prices that are not changed. The pro…ts obtained from the deviation do not depend on h; hence:
Suppose now that M considers to change h prices to p i < v 1 2 . In that case they face a demand given by the second expression in (2) . The potential deviation is not pro…table provided that:
;p m ; p nm 0; 8i 2 I where dp i = 0 for all the remaining (k h) prices that are not changed.
As the deviation pro…t increases in h, the most pro…table possible deviation takes place as h = k. The possible deviation should not lead to higher pro…ts than at the candidate equilibrium, requiring:
Outsider …rm j: the candidate equilibrium price for a representative
; an analogous reasoning can be used to rule out possible deviations. Suppose that …rm j considers raising its price to p j > v 1 2 . In this case, the …rm would face a demand as if it was a local monopolist. The potential deviation is not pro…table provided that:
which, as in the previous case, implies:
Suppose …rm j consider decreasing the price to p j < v 1. In that case the demand faced by the …rm is given by the second expression in (3 = v m 4U : As k < n, v 4D v 4U is surely satis…ed.
Q.E.D.
C Proof of Proposition 2
In Region 1 the di¤erence between the pre-and post-merger equilibrium prices are: p m p bm = (k 1) (n + k 1) (2N n 1) (n 1) (n k) (2n + k 2)
p nm p bm = k (k 1) (2N n 1) (n 1) (n k) (k + 2n 2)
As k < n, both are strictly positive. Then p am > p bm .
In Region 2 it is immediate to verify that p m = p nm = p bm = v 1.
In Region 3, the price di¤erentials are: 
